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PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS: TEMPORAL
ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD UNDER FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(B)
INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 801(d)(1)(B) allows a prior extrajudicial statement, consistent with a witness's in-court testimony, to be admitted to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or
improper motive.' This Rule specifies that such statements are not hearsay and allows them to be used for the truth of the matter asserted, thus
giving substantive effect to statements that were admissible at common
law only to rehabilitate the credibility of a witness who had been
impeached. 2
Confusion over the standards of admissibility for prior consistent
statements exists in three areas. The first area of confusion concerns
prior consistent statements offered as substantive evidence under FRE
801(d)(1)(B) to rebut the implication that a motive to fabricate affected
the veracity of the trial testimony.3 A controversy has arisen among the
federal courts of appeals as to whether admissibility of such a prior consistent statement is contingent on its being made prior to the alleged
fabrication or improper motive.' The majority of courts that have addressed the issue find this temporal requirement implicit in FRE
801(d)(1)(B), 5 in order to ensure the statement's relevance. 6 A minority,
1. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) provides in relevant part that a prior consistent statement
is not hearsay if "[tihe declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, and the statement is... (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive."
2. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note ("Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule they are
substantive evidence."); see also United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978)
(intent of the drafters of FRE 801(d)(1)(B) was to permit substantive use of prior consistent statements that would have gained admission at common law to rehabilitate); 4 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
801(d)(l)(B)[01], at 801-157 (1985)
[hereinafter 4 Weinstein] (FRE 801(d)(1)(B) should be interpreted narrowly to limit admission of prior consistent statements "to situations in which rehabilitation through consistency would formerly have been allowed").
At common law, two types of prior consistent statements were admissible to rehabilitate the credibility of an impeached witness. The first type was prior statements offered
to rebut the inference that an improper motive led to fabrication of a witness's in-court
testimony, see infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. The second type was statements
offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication by ensuring that impeaching statements
were not taken out of context, thus comporting with the doctrine of completeness. See
infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
4. See United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986) (recognizing this
controversy), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 906 (1987); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d
1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982) (same), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 906 (1987); United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir.
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however, admit the statement regardless of its temporal relationship to
the alleged fabrication or improper motive.7 Under this view, the statement's timing is thought to affect its weight, rather than being dispositive
of its admissibility.'
The second issue arises when courts have admitted prior consistent
statements solely as rehabilitative evidence.9 These cases demonstrate
confusion as to whether the standards for substantive admission under
FRE 801(d)(1)(B) also govern the admissibility of statements offered to
rehabilitate an impeached witness's credibility.'" Some cases hold that
these standards must be the same 1 for the statement to rebut the impeachment, thus, a rehabilitative statement must antedate the motive to
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984); United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United
States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1978).
6. See United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that
statements made after motive to falsify are not relevant), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 906
(1987); United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.) (prior consistent statement
only relevant to rebut charge of recent fabrication if made "prior to the time the alleged
motive to falsify arose"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); United States v. McPartlin,
595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.) (prior consistent statement made where motive to falsify
existed has no probative value to rebut charge), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United
States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978) (prior consistent statement must
antedate motive to fabricate to be relevant to rebut impeachment).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1117 (1983); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981);
United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1981).
8. See United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982) (timing of
prior consistent statements may only affect materiality), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117
(1983).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 462 (1986); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 784 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51,
70 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
For a definition and discussion of rehabilitative evidence, see infra note 24.
10. Compare United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (prior consistent statements offered for rehabilitation need not meet admission standards for substantive use under FRE 801(d)(1)(B)), aff'd on other grounds, 449
U.S. 424 (1981) with United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978) (standards
that govern substantive use of prior consistent statements also govern rehabilitative use).
Although the confusion concerning the admissibility standards of prior consistent
statements offered solely to rehabilitate exists among Second Circuit opinions, courts of
appeals for other circuits have addressed the issue, recognized the opposing views, and
reconciled them in favor of a lesser standard of admission for such statements. See United
States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768,
784-85 (4th Cir. 1983).
11. See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978) (standards for admission of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence are same as those for rehabilitative); United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 681 n.40 (2d Cir. 1978) (prior consistent
statements that do not satisfy FRE 801(d)(1)(B) standards are not admissible for substantive or rehabilitative use).
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fabricate. 2 Other courts, however, opting for
a broader range of admis3
sibility, do not impose such a requirement.'
The third area encompasses prior consistent statements offered for
completeness purposes, rather than to rebut the inference that a motive
to fabricate affected the trial testimony. Statements offered for completeness rebut a charge of recent fabrication, achieved through the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement, by placing the impeaching
statement in its proper context' 4 or casting doubt on whether it truly was
inconsistent with the in-court testimony.1 5 Prior consistent statements
offered to explain the impeaching statement need not predate the alleged
fabrication in order to rebut the impeachment. 6 Statements offered to
12. See United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United
States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1337 (1987);
United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978).
13. See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985) (substantive use of
prior consistent statements is contingent on their being made before motive to falsify, but
those offered to rehabilitate need not meet this stricter standard); United States v. Parodi,
703 F.2d 768, 784-85 (4th Cir. 1983) (prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate
need not meet substantive admission standards); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 6870 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring) (prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate are not governed by the more stringent standards required for statements offered
substantively), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
14. Impeachment of a witness by introduction of portions of a writing or recording
inconsistent with his in-court testimony may be rebutted through the admission of the
remainder of the statement, consistent with the witness's in-court testimony, to place the
impeaching statement in its proper context. This use of prior consistent statements comports with the doctrine of completeness. See United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 533
(8th Cir.) (admitting prior consistent statements to rebut inference of recent fabrication
created by prior inconsistent statements), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 462 (1986); United
States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[W]here substantial parts of a prior
statement are used in cross-examination of a witness, fairness dictates that the balance be
received so that the jury will not be misled ...."),aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424
(1981).
15. See United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (prior consistent
statements can "cast doubt on whether.., the impeaching statement is really inconsistent with the trial testimony"); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1985)
(remainder of report admitted as prior consistent statement to show "whether the impeaching statements... were inconsistent within the context of the interview, and if so,
to what extent"); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1252 (7th Cir.) (prior consistent
statements in memorandum admitted to show the extent to which impeaching statements
in the memorandum were actually inconsistent), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979).
16. See United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 & n.21 (2d Cir. 1980) (prior
consistent statements made subsequent to motive to fabricate admissible to place impeaching statements in context); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979)
(prior consistent statements admissible to provide proper context for inconsistent statments regardless of statements' timing), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
Prior consistent statements offered for completeness will be admitted only when relevant to rebut the impeaching statement by explaining or qualifying it. See United States
v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984) (doctrine of completeness "does not require
introduction of portions of a statement that are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the
passages that have been admitted"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161 (1985); United States v.
Matin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1982) (prior consistent statements should be admitted for
purposes of completeness when "necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place it in
context, or to avoid misleading the trier of fact").
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place an impeaching statement in context must be distinguished 7 from
those statements offered to show that the alleged motive to fabricate did
not affect the trial testimony, which are only responsive to the impeachment if made before the motive arose.18
This Note examines the three uses of prior consistent statements and
argues that the standards of admissibility for such statements must be
determined by the purpose for which the statement is offered. Part I of
this Note reviews the admissibility of prior consistent statements before
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It also discusses FRE
801(d)(1)(B) and the criteria for substantive admissibility contained
therein.
Part II argues that only prior consistent statements that precede the
motive to falsify are relevant to rebut the impeachment by showing that
the in-court testimony was not affected by the motive, and thus are admissible for their truth. It also addresses the question of whether substantive admissibility standards govern rehabilitative use of prior
consistent statements and concludes that the standards should be the
same. Further, Part II elaborates upon the distinction between the two
types of prior statements that may be given substantive effect under FRE
801(d)(1)(B): statements offered to rebut the inference that a motive to
fabricate affected the veracity of a witness's in-court testimony, and statements offered to rebut impeachment through a prior inconsistent statement by placing that statement in its proper context and clarifying the
extent to which it is actually inconsistent. Finally, Part II concludes that
the standards these two types of statements must meet to serve their respective rebuttal purposes are also the standards that must be met to
ensure substantive admission.
I.

DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR
CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

A. Admissibility of PriorConsistent Statements at Common Law
Courts at common law originally took a narrow view of the admissibility of prior consistent statements. When offered as substantive evidence,' 9 prior consistent statements were inadmissible because the
17. See Martin, PriorConsistentStatements, 196 N.Y.L.J. 94 at 1, col. 1 (1986) (indicating that this distinction is important because it suggests different admissibility standards). But see United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (indicating that
there is no difference between prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate and those
offered for completeness). See also infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 6 and infra notes 64-67 & 75-76 and accompanying text.
19. Evidence offered substantively is introduced to prove the truth of the fact or facts
asserted within the statement. See United States v. Sanders, 639 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir.
Mar. 1981) (evidence offered to prove the substance of a statement is offered as proof of
the facts asserted therein); C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 251, at 744 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCormick] (substantive evidence is offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted). Such evidence must be distinguished from evidence offered
solely to prove the fact that the statement was made, to discredit a witness, or to rehabili-
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statements were hearsay. 20 In addition, prior consistent statements offered as corroborative evidence2 ' were excluded' as being unnecessarily
cumulative.23 Further, a prior consistent statement offered to rehabilitate one who had been impeached. See United States v. Sanders, 639 F.2d at 270 (statements offered substantively must be distinguished from statements that are offered only to
prove that the statement was made). See generally M. Graham, Handbook of Federal
Evidence § 801.5, at 695 (1986) [hereinafter Graham, FederalEvidence] (discussing substantive use of evidence under FRE 801); McCormick, supra, § 251, at 744 (discussing
substantive use of prior consistent statements); Morgan, A Suggested Classificationof Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 231 (1922) (elaborating the distinction between statements offered substantively and those not offered for their truth). See
also infra note 24 (discussing rehabilitative evidence).
20. See Townsend v. United States, 106 F.2d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 1939) (prior consistent
statements were hearsay, and thus could be not be used in case-in-chief for their truth); 4
J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1123, at 254 (J.Chadbourn rev. ed.
1972) [hereinafter Wigmore] (prior statements offered substantively were barred by hearsay rule); see also United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 232 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing
that prior consistent statements offered for their truth always were barred by hearsay

rule).
The underlying reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence was that statements made
out of court were inherently unreliable. Since such statements are not made under oath,
or at trial, the trier of fact is unable to observe the declarant's demeanor. Moreover, the
declarant of the statement is not subject to the scrutiny of cross-examination. See McCormick, supra note 19, § 245, at 727-28; 5 Wigmore, supra, § 1362, at 3-10; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 182-85
(1948); Comment, Hearsay Under the ProposedFederalRules: A DiscretionaryApproach,
15 Wayne L. Rev. 1079, 1106-07 (1969) [hereinafter Comment, Hearsay].
21. Corroborative evidence includes those statements offered during the presentation
of the proponent's case-in-chief to bolster the in-court testimony of a witness by showing
that a consistent statement was made previously, rather than to prove the truth of the
statement. See Schoppel v. United States, 270 F.2d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 1959) (prior consistent statements offer impermissible "corroborative support of a witness by showing that
after the event under inquiry and before the trial he made statements to the same effect");
see also 4 Wigmore, supra note 20, § 1123, at 254-55 (discussing admissibility of prior
consistent statements as corroborative evidence-in-chief).
22. See Mellon v. United States, 170 F.2d 583, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1948) (holding that
in-court testimony may not be corroborated by proof of prior consistent statements);
Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931) (corroboration by prior consistencies during proponent's case-in-chief is impermissible); United States v. Keller, 145 F.
Supp. 692, 697 (D.N.J. 1956) (consistent statements are not allowed to bolster witness's
testimony during case-in-chief).
23. See Graham, PriorConsistent Statements" Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the FederalRules
of Evidence Critique and Proposal, 30 Hastings L.J. 575, 581 (1979) ("Bemause... the
corroborative effect upon the credibility of the witness is slight at best, the common law
came to reject prior consistent statements offered upon direct examination as being too
cumbersome for the trial process.") (footnote omitted).
The introduction of prior statements encumbers the trial court without aiding the truth
seeking process, because the repetition of a previous statement bolsters the in-court testimony without making its truth more probable or the witness more trustworthy. See 4
Wigmore, supra note 20, § 1124, at 258 ("The idea that the mere repetition of a story
gives it any force or proves its truth is contrary to common observation and experience
that a falsehood may be repeated as often as the truth." (quoting State v. Parish, 79 N.C.
610, 612-14 (1878))).
Prior consistent statements offered as corroborative evidence also were excluded because they reinforced the credibility of a witness who had not yet been impeached. See
Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("When a witness' testi-
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tate the credibility of a witness whose testimony had been impeached 24
was inadmissible because the statement was unreliable.2 5
This restrictive view of the admission of prior consistent statements
subsequently was liberalized.2 6 Later decisions admitted prior consistent
statements to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility had been impeached by a charge that his testimony was the result of recent
fabrication or improper motive.27 In the face of this type of impeachment, 28 prior consistent statements were admitted2 9 because they aided
mony stands without attempted impeachment, his out-of-court utterances are ordinarily
inadmissible."); Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931) (prior consistent statements were impermissible prior to impeachment); United States v. Keller, 145
F. Supp. 692, 697 (D.N.J. 1956) (corroboration by prior consistent statements only allowed to sustain credibility of witness whose testimony has been impeached); see also
McCormick, supra note 19, § 49, at 115 ("[I]n the absence of an attack upon credibility
no sustaining evidence is allowed.").
24. Impeachment of a witness is accomplished by introducing evidence that discredits
the witness's credibility, thereby casting doubt on the witness's ability or willingness to
tell the truth. See generally Graham, FederalEvidence, supra note 19, § 607.1, at 414-16
(discussing impeachment of a witness); McCormick, supra note 19, § 33, at 72-73 (same).
After impeachment has occurred, the opponent may offer evidence to rebut the impeaching fact in an effort to restore the witness's diminished credibility. Such evidence thus
acts to rehabilitate the witness. See generally 4 Jones on Evidence § 26:24, at 231 (1972)
(discussing rehabilitation of a witness); McCormick, supra note 19, § 49, at 115-17
(same).
25. Originally, prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate a witness were
deemed unreliable because they were not made under oath. See Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S.
(10 Pet.) 412, 439 (1836); United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 622 (2d Cir. 1948).
26. See Applebaum v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 472 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir.
1972) (recognizing liberalization of general rule prohibiting use of prior consistent statements to rehabilitate); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944) (recognizing exceptions to general prohibition on admission of prior consistent statements); see
also United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 232 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing admissibility
standards before Federal Rules of Evidence).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (admitting only those prior consistent statements made before declarant had motive to fabricate); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 197-98 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 820 (1970); Ryan v. United Parcel Serv., 205 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1953) (same);
United States v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950) (same); Affronti v. United
States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944) (same); see also United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401,
1404 (2d Cir. 1972) (admitting prior consistent statement to rebut a charge of recent
fabrication).
28. In-court testimony can be assailed as recent fabrication or the result of.improper
motive or bias in several ways. See 4 Wigmore, supra note 20, §§ 1126-29, at 258-76;
Graham, supra note 23, at 583.
The first type of impeachment is accomplished through the presentation of evidence
indicating that the witness made a statement prior to trial that was inconsistent with his
trial testimony. See 4 Wigmore, supra note 20, § 1126, at 258-67 (discussion of impeachment by prior inconsistent statements). Proof of such inconsistency gives rise to the inference that the in-court testimony is fabricated. See Applebaum v. American Export
Isbrandtsen Lines, 472 F.2d 56, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1972) (proof of statement inconsistent
with witness's in-court testimony "was tantamount to a charge of recent fabrication");
Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7-8 (8th Cir. 1944) (impeachment occurred through
evidence of statements inconsistent with witness's trial testimony).
Impeachment also occurs through the introduction of evidence showing that the witness's in-court testimony was the result of improper motive or interest. See 4 Wigmore,
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the trier of fact in determining the credibility of the witness.3 0 The trial
judge had the discretion to determine whether a prior consistent statement was admissible to rebut the impeachment. 3 Because of the questionable reliability of out-of-court statements,32 and the traditional
prohibition against the use of any prior
consistent statements, 33 courts
34
caution.
with
exercised this discretion
supra note 20, § 1128, at 268-70 (discussion of impeachment by bias, interest, or corruption). The most frequent example of such a motive is the witness's hope for leniency in
return for inculpatory testimony. See United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1404 (2d Cir.
1972) (impeachment by implying that prosecution witness had contrived his story to
avoid prosecution); United States v. Rodriguez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (impeachment implied fabrication on part of witness/alleged coconspirator as a result of an
agreement with the prosecution in return for leniency).
A third form of impeachment is the presentation of witnesses whose testimony contradicts that of the witness being impeached; the proferred contradictions amount to a
charge that the witness falsified his testimony. See Ryan v. United Parcel Serv., 205 F.2d
362, 364 (2d Cir. 1953) (police officer's testimony contradicted that of the defendant's
employee, thus implying that the employee falsified his testimony); see also 4 Wigmore,
supra note 20, § 1127, at 267 (discussion of impeachment by contradiction).
Last, impeachment can occur through evidence showing that the witness had previously failed to mention a fact to which he testified in court, at a time when it would have
been natural for him to do so. See 4 Wigmore, supra note 20, § 1129, at 270-76 (discussion of impeachment through recent contrivance charge). Although the impeachment
stems from the omission, as opposed to an affirmative contradiction or inconsistency, the
testimony is no less subject to the implication that the witness's testimony was contrived.
See Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 197-98 (2d Cir.) (witness's failure to mention fact in accident report that he later testified to led to inference that in-court testimony was contrived), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970).
29. See supra note 27.
30. See Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (prior consistent statements admitted when helpful in determining trustworthiness of testimony);
Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931) (prior consistent statement
must "contain[] such fact or facts pertinent to the issues involved as reasonably furnish to
the jury some test of the witness' integrity"); see also McCormick, supra note 19, § 49, at
116 (restricts admission of prior consistent statements to situations where they are "logically relevant to explain the impeaching fact").
The customary proscription against prior statements was retained when they had no
force to rebut or explain other types of impeachment. See McCormick, supra note 19,
§ 49, at 118. For instance, prior consistent statements are not responsive to impeachment
charging a witness with bad character or reputation for untruthfulness, and are excluded
as having no rehabilitative value. See United States v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140, 143 (3d Cir.
1949); see also McCormick, supra note 19, § 49, at 118 ("When the attack takes the form
of impeachment of character, by showing misconduct, convictions or bad reputation, it is
generally agreed that there is no color for sustaining by consistent statements."); 4 Wigmore, supra note 20, § 1125, at 258 (evidence of prior consistent statements is not responsive to character impeachment, "but evades it by retorting with the irrelevant fact that
the witness has been consistent").
31. See United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1404 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing Felice v.
Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970)).
32. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
34. See Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 8 (8th Cir. 1944) ("Evidence of prior
consistent statements should.., be received with great caution and only for the purpose
of enabling the jury to make a correct appraisal of the credibility of the witness who has
been impeached."); Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931) ("the court
should be extremely guarded" and admit prior consistent statements only on the issue of
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Generally, the courts required the proponent of a prior consistent
statement to demonstrate that the statement was made prior to the time
the alleged motive for fabrication or improper influence arose.3 5 A prior
consistent statement antedating the motive to fabricate effectively rehabilitated the witness by showing that he had made the same statement
independent of the discrediting influence,3 6 thereby rebutting the impli-

cation that the witness falsified his trial testimony as a result of an improper motive.37 A statement made while the motive to falsify already
existed was excluded as being merely cumulative.38
Common law courts also permitted the use of prior consistent statements under the doctrine of testimonial completeness.3 9 If one portion of
credibility, not for their truth); see also Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (prior consistent statements admitted to rehabilitate only when they are
clearly helpful); Thomas, Rehabilitating the Impeached Witness with Consistent Statements, 32 Mo. L. Rev. 472, 472-74 (1967) (prior consistent statements admitted only as
rehabilitative evidence).
35. See United States v. Lombardi, 550 F.2d 827, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1977); Applebaum
v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 472 F.2d 56, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1972); United States
v. Rodriguez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d
192, 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); Ryan v. United Parcel Serv., 205
F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950);
Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944); Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d
417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931); United States v. Keller, 145 F. Supp. 692, 697 (D.N.J. 1956).
But see Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 104 (8th Cir.) (prior consistent statements
admitted without regard to their timing), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1119 (1968).
36. See 4 Wigmore, supra note 20, § 1128, at 268 ("A consistent statement, at a time
prior to the existence of a fact said to indicate bias, interest, or corruption, will effectively
explain away the force of the impeaching evidence; because it is thus made to appear that
the statement... was independent of the discrediting influence.") (emphasis in original);
see also United States v. Rodriguez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (prior consistent
statements admitted because they "clearly antedated any motive [the witness] might have
had to fabricate a story in order to obtain leniency from the prosecution."); United States
v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950) (prior consistent statements admitted to rehabilitate if made before improper motivation to make such statements arose); Dowdy v.
United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931) (after witness had been impeached, proof
of prior consistent statements are admissible to rehabilitate by showing that witness gave
similar account when no motive to falsify existed).
37. See Thomas, supra note 34, at 475 (only a prior consistent statement made before
to the alleged discrediting influence is relevant "to refute the claim that those [impeaching] facts had any effect on the testimony").
38. See Coltrane v.United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[M]ere
repetition does not imply veracity.").
A prior statement subject to the same improper influence as the already impeached
trial testimony has no force to rebut the charge, and is mere repetition. See United States
v. Corry, 183 F.2d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 1950) (prior consistent statements made at a time
when the declarant had "inducement to make these statements because of pressure or
personal interest" have no rehabilitative value); Comment, Hearsay, supra note 20, at
1092 ("A consistent statement made subsequent to the time any such influence or motive
arose would not rebut the charge, but merely show that the witness responded in the
same way when under the same pressures.").
39. See United States v. Lev, 276 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir.) (prior consistent statements
"admitted solely to round out and complete" portions used on cross-examination), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944) (after
impeachment by one portion of statement, other prior consistent portions may be admit-
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a statement was used to impeach a witness, another portion of the statement, relating to the same subject matter,"' could be introduced to ensure that the trier of fact was not misled by statements taken out of
context.4 1 Thus, these prior statements were admitted
to explain or clar42
ify a statement already used for impeachment.
B. Admissibility under FederalRule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)
FRE 801 defines hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered at trial
to prove the truth of the matter asserted within the statement.4 3 Such
statements generally are inadmissible as unreliable evidence." The prohibition on the admission of hearsay, however, is not absolute.45 FRE
ted "to meet the force of the impeachment"); United States v. Weinbren, 121 F.2d 826,
828-29 (2d Cir. 1941) (remainder of report already introduced was admitted to allow jury
to examine report in its entirety). For a discussion of the completeness doctrine, see
supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
40. Completeness purposes were served only when one part of a statement already
had been introduced into evidence to impeach a witness. See United States v. Smith, 328
F.2d 848, 850 (6th Cir.) (the remainder of statement made by witness was admitted for
completeness after portions of statement were used to impeach him) (citing Affronti v.
United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944)), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 936 (1964); United
States v. Lev, 276 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir.) (portion of statement used to impeach witness),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960).
The remainder of a statement was not admitted unless relevant to explain the impeaching statement. See United States v. Smith, 328 F.2d 848, 850 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 936 (1964); Cafasso v. Pennsylvania R.R., 169 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1948) (citing
Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944)); see also United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 644, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("The remainder of the material that is put
in must be relevant in order to make the portion which is originally introduced understood or to explain, clarify or qualify that which was originally put in.").
41. See United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728, 735 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that remainder of statement was needed to provide the "complete story"); United States v. Lev,
276 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir.) (admitting prior consistent statements to place impeaching
statements in context and to clarify portions already introduced), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
812 (1960); see also Fed. R. Evid. 106 advisory committee's note (one purpose of rule of
completeness is to prevent the "misleading impression created by taking matters out of
context").
42. See United States v. Littwin, 338 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1964) (admitting the
remainder of a statement "to explain or rebut the adverse inferences which might arise
from the incomplete character of the evidence introduced by [the] adversary"), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 911 (1965); Cafasso v. Pennsylvania R.R., 169 F.2d 451, 453 (3d Cir.
1948) (if one portion of statement used to impeach, the remainder of that statement relevant to the part already introduced is admissible to rehabilitate witness's credibility);
Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 8 (8th Cir. 1944) (same).
43. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
44. See supra note 20. Hearsay statements are unreliable because they suffer from
problems concerning the perception, memory, ambiguity, and sincerity of the out-ofcourt declarant. See Graham,FederalEvidence, supra note 19, § 801.1, at 681-83; 5 Wigmore, supra note 20, §§ 1361-62, at 2-3, 10; Morgan, supra note 20, at 185-88.
45. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain exceptions admitting otherwise inadmissible statements made under circumstances providing indicia of reliability, thereby lessening traditional hearsay dangers. See Fed. R. Evid. 803 (exceptions where availability of
declarant is immaterial); Fed. R. Evid. 804 (exceptions contingent on unavailability of
declarant). Although out-of-court statements that satisfy a hearsay exception are not
admissible automatically, the hearsay rule is no longer a bar. See Fed. R. Evid. 803 advi-
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801(d)(1) provides that certain extrajudicial statements are not hearsay if
they meet the criteria set forth therein. 6
Prior consistent statements are admissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(B)
when the declarant of the proffered statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination.4" Admissibility of out-of-court statements
under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) is limited to those statements that are consistent
with the declarant's in-court testimony4" and offered to rebut a charge
that the in-court testimony was the result of recent fabrication or subject
to improper influence.4 9 The term "recent" as used by FRE 801(d)(1)(B)
sory committee's note ("The exceptions are phrased in terms of nonapplication of the
hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms of admissibility, in order to repel any implication that other possible grounds for exclusion are eliminated from consideration.").
46. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1); see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) advisory committee's
note ("The position taken by the Advisory Committee... is founded upon an unwillingness to countenance the general use of prior prepared statements as substantive evidence,
but with a recognition that particular circumstances call for a contrary result."); McCormick, supra note 19, § 251, at 746 ("[T]he Advisory Committee ... exempt[ed] from
classification as hearsay certain prior statements thought by circumstances to be free of
the danger of abuse.").
47. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). The requirement that the declarant testify is based
on the rationale that he is now under oath, in the presence of the trier of fact, and subject
to scrutiny by the opponent, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) advisory committee's note, thus
avoiding some of the traditional objections to hearsay evidence. See supra note 20 (discussing objections to hearsay).
There is some question as to whether a statement consistent with the declarant's incourt testimony may be elicited only from the declarant himself, or whether it may be
received from a non-declarant witness. See United States v. Maultasch, 596 F.2d 19, 2425 (2d Cir. 1979). At least one court has held that FRE 801(d)(1)(B) requires that only
the declarant may testifi to the making of a prior consistent statement. See United States
v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 687 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124, 1139 (1982). Under
this view, the declarant must be subject to cross-examination specifically concerning the
statement, as stated in the Rule, rather than to have been subject to cross-examination at
some point during the trial. Id. Conversely, several courts of appeals have permitted nondeclarant witnesses to testify to the declarant's prior consistent statement. Thus, they
have declined to enforce the requirement that the declarant be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985,
1001-02 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Lanier, 578 F.2d
1246, 1255-56 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 856 (1978); United States v. Zuniga-Lara,
570 F.2d 1286, 1287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961 (1978); United States v. McGrath, 558 F.2d 1102, 1107 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). Resolution of this conflict, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
48. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Provided the prior statement is sufficiently similar to
rebut the impeachment charge, the statement need not be an exact duplication of the incourt statement to satisfy the consistency requirement of FRE 801(d)(1)(B). See United
States v. Lombardi, 550 F.2d 827, 828 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (prior statement omitting one detail, but otherwise consistent with trial testimony, admitted as prior consistent
statement to rebut implication that witness falsified his testimony).
49. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
There is a slight distinction between a charge of recent fabrication and one of improper
motive. Impeachment by improper motive casts doubt on the witness's testimony by suggesting that it was given under some influence that may have affected the veracity of the
trial testimony. See Graham, supra note 23, at 584 ("An 'improper' motive is any motive
that tends to induce the witness to do anything but tell the whole truth."); ef. Thomas,
supra note 34, at 474-76 (discussing impeachment by bias or improper motive; written
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence); Note, Evidence: Prior Consistent
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indicates that the testimony was contrived at some point after the impeaching event, rather than proximate to its being given at trialY°
The Rule further provides that the attack on credibility may be implied as well as express." Thus, impeachment that elicits facts from
which it may be inferred that the testimony was fabricated is as susceptible to rebuttal through the introduction of a prior consistent statement as
impeachment that expressly states the charge.52
A prior consistent statement offered under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) can rebut impeachment by a charge of recent fabrication in two ways. First,
the statement can directly refute the charge of recent fabrication or improper influence by showing that the motive to fabricate did not affect
the in-court testimony. 3 Second, a prior consistent statement can be offered to rebut an impeaching inconsistent statement by placing the stateStatements Admissiblefor Rehabilitation When Witness's Trial Testimony Assailed as Recent Fabrication,45 Calif. L. Rev. 202, 203 (1957) [hereinafter Note, Recent Fabrication]
(same).
Recent fabrication, however, is not a method of impeachment itself, but rather, is the
effect of several means of impeachment. See Graham,supra note 23, at 583. The inference that the witness consciously falsified his testimony may arise from impeachment by
a prior inconsistent statement, or by the witness's omission of facts consistent with his
trial testimony at a time when it would have been natural to mention those facts. See id.
Further blurring the distinction between recent fabrication and improper motive is that
evidence of the existence of an improper motive also may amount to a charge of recent
fabrication. See Graham, supra note 23, at 583 ("[I]mproper motive or influence is an
underlying reason for the fabrication, not really a separate charge.") (emphasis in original); see also supra note 28 (discussion of common law methods of impeachment by recent fabrication).
50. See Graham, supra note 23, at 582 ("[A] 'fabrication' is 'recent' if the in-court
testimony is expressly or impliedly charged to have been consciously fabricated at any
time after the event."); see also United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir.
1986) ("The fabrication of which the rule speaks is the alleged fabrication underlying the
witness's trial testimony, not some fabrication resulting in a prior inconsistent out-ofcourt statement.. . ."), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1337 (1987).
51. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). See United States v. Mock, 640 F.2d 629, 632 (5th
Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981) (prior consistent statements may be admitted in response to an
implied, as well as an express, charge); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th
Cir.) (same), cert denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979).
52. See United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir.) ("The fact that...
counsel may not have intended to imply that [the witness's] story was fabricated ... is
irrelevant if that inference fairly arises from the line of questioning... pursued."), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979); see also Graham, supra note 23, at 585-86 (implied charge
occurs where cross-examiner elicits facts from which the jury may infer improper motivation; express charge occurs where cross-examiner directly asserts that the witness is subject to improper motivation).
53. See Graham,supra note 23, at 591 (prior consistent statement made before motive
to falsify "does not attack the basic fact, that there is evidence that indicates [improper
motive], only the propriety of drawing the inference" that motive affected the testimony);
see also United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.) (consistent statement
made to FBI before plea bargain was reached admitted to "rebut inferences of recent
fabrication motivated by the agreement."), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); United
States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1099-1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (when witness was impeached by evidence that he received money to inform, prior consistent statement made
subsequent to alleged motive was inadmissible because it did not "remove the implication
of improper motive from [witness's] prior testimony").
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ment in its full context.5 4 It is necessary for courts to ascertain for which
of these two purposes a prior consistent statement is being offered because the standards that govern admissibility are different for each
purpose."5

The drafters of the Federal Rules recognized that prior consistent
statements were admissible at common law to rehabilitate a witness's

credibility when he had been charged with recent fabrication.5 6 Both
uses of prior consistent statements were contemplated within the purview
of the Rule.57 FRE 801(d)(1)(B), however, gives these extrajudicial
statements substantive effect. 58

II.

THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE TEMPORAL ADMISSIBILITY
STANDARD

FRE 801(d)(1)(B) does not expressly state whether admissibility of a
prior consistent statement is contingent on the statement antedating an
impeaching fact or event that implies the existence of a motive to fabricate.59 The majority of the federal courts of appeals that have considered
the issue hold that prior consistent statements are admissible under FRE
801(d)(1)(B) only if made before the alleged motive to fabricate. 60 A
54. See Graham, supra note 23, at 591 (prior consistent statement may rebut the impeaching inference by showing that statement was taken out of context); see also United
States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (prior consistent statements could clarify prior inconsistent statements by showing that they were not really inconsistent);
United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1985) (prior consistent statements
were admitted to place inconsistent statements in context and show whether they were
truly inconsistent); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979) (prior consistent statements were admitted in rebuttal to ensure that jury was not misled by impeaching statements taken out of context), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).

55. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
56. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note; supra note 2 and accompanying text.
57. FRE 801(d)(1)(B) expressly requires that the prior consistent statement be offered
to rebut the impeachment. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Such impeachment can be rebutted either by showing that the motive was not operative on the in-court testimony, see
supra note 53 and accompanying text, or by explaining an impeaching inconsistent statement that may have been taken out of context, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
In addition, FRE 801(d)(1)(B) was promulgated to give substantive effect to those
prior consistent statements previously admissible at common law to rehabilitate a witness
impeached by a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence. See Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note. Because both of these uses of prior consistent
statements were allowed at common law, see supra notes 2 & 35-42 and accompanying
text, they are within the scope of FR.E 801(d)(1)(B).
58. See United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 905 (1980); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978); Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note.
59. See United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 784 (4th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
FRE 801(d)(1)(B) contains no express temporal requirement); United States v.
Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Weinstein, C.J.) (noting that temporal requirement was result of judicial interpretation of FR.E 801(d)(1)(B), rather than
explicit in the Rule itself); Graham, supra note 23, at 586 (recognizing the lack of express
temporal reference in FRE 801(d)(1)(B)).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
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minority of courts, however, hold that the Rule does not require automatic exclusion of a prior consistent statement made subsequent to the
alleged motive to fabricate. 6
A. Precedence to a Motive for FabricationEnsures Relevancy in
Rebuttal
Evidence is considered relevant6 2 when that evidence tends to make a
matter at issue more or less probable than the matter would be absent the
evidence.6" Although a prior consistent statement may be relevant to
prove the facts asserted,' FRE 801(d)(1)(B) conditions admissibility on
the statement being offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or imnied, 107 S. Ct. 906 (1987); United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir.
1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984); United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United
States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978).
61. See e.g., United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1117 (1983); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981);
United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1981).
62. Evidence must satisfy the standard of relevancy set forth in FRE 401 to be admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, which provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
This relevance standard does not require that the evidence be sufficient to prove a
matter at trial, thus evidence that has even minimal probative value may be deemed relevant. See McCormick, supra note 19, § 185, at 541-43; 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Weinstein's Evidence 401[06], at 401-40 to 401-41 (1986) [hereinafter 1 Weinstein].
For a discussion of FRE 401 and the relevancy requirement under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, see Graham, FederalEvidence, supra note 19, § 401.1, at 14649; 1 D. Louisell
& C. Mueller, Federal Evidence, §§ 91-94, at 638-80 (1977); McCormick, supra note 19,
§§ 184-85, at 540-48; 1 Weinstein, supra, 401[06] to 1, 401[08], at 401-33 to 401-57.
63. Since FRE 401 provides that evidence is relevant for trial purposes if it tends to
make any fact more or less probable, it can be inferred that evidence that is offered for a
specific purpose would be relevant to accomplish that purpose only if the evidence makes
the issue it is offered to prove more or less probable. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. Thus,
although a prior consistent statement may be considered relevant under FRE 401, see
infra note 64, it is not relevant to rebut the impeachment unless it has some probative
force to do so. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
FRE 402 provides that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by... these rules." Thus, in order to be admissible, a prior consistent statement
must be relevant, and must satisfy the standards provided in FRE 801(d)(l)(B), which
exempts the statement from the hearsay rule. See United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d
758, 766 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); Travers, Prior Consistent Statements, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 974, 976 (1978).
64. Since the statement, by definition, is consistent with in-court testimony, it would
be relevant to prove its truth under FRE 401, as the in-court testimony has already been
admitted and is necessarily relevant. See Graham, supra note 23, at 579 n.16 (recognizing the view that a prior consistent statement, no more probative than the in-court testimony, is irrelevant since "mere repetition does not make the existence of a fact more or
less probable than without the evidence since the identical evidence has already been
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proper motive.6 5 Prior consistent statements, therefore, should be admitted under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) only when relevant to rehabilitate.6 6 A
prior consistent statement is relevant to rebut only if it is responsive to
the impeachment charge.67
A charge of recent fabrication or improper motive impeaches the veracity of the in-court testimony by intimating either that there exists an
improper influence affecting the credibility of the declarant's testimony 68
or that the declarant has consciously falsified his testimony. 69 A stateintroduced," but asserting that the better view is to consider the prior statement without
reference to the trial testimony).
Several courts that have considered the admissibility of prior consistent statements
have equated relevance under FRE 402 with relevance to rebut an impeaching fact or
statement. The court in United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978), set
forth three elements that the proponent of a prior consistent statement must prove to
assure admissibility under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), as well as relevancy under FRE 402. First,
the statement must be consistent with the witness's trial testimony. Id. at 234. Second,
the statement must be offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication
or improper influence. Id. Finally, the statement must have been made before the alleged
motive to fabricate arose to be relevant to rebut. Id. at 233-34; see also United States v.
Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985) (prior consistent statement offered under FRE
801(d)(1)(B) may not be relevant under FRE 402 if it does not rebut the charge). There
is a distinction, however, between the relevance standard under FRE 401 and relevance
to rebut. Although a prior consistent statement is relevant to prove its truth under the
broad standard of FRE 401, see supra note 63, and thus admissible under FRE 402, it
also should be relevant to rebut the charge under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) to gain admission.
See infra note 66.
65. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
66. See United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986) (prior consistent
statements must be relevant to rebut charge of recent fabrication), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
906 (1987); United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.) (in addition to satisfying express requirements in FRE 801(d)(1)(B), prior consistent statement must be relevant to rebut impeachment), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); United States v. Guevara,
598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (excluding prior consistent statement that did not
serve to rebut charge of improper motive); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321,
1351 (7th Cir.) ("Evidence offered under [FRE 801(d)(1)(B)] must have some probative
value in rebutting the implied charge of recent fabrication or improper motive."), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 234-35 (2d Cir. 1978)
(holding that prior consistent statements irrelevant to rebut impeachment were inadmissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(B)).
67. See supra note 66.
68. See United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 337-38 (8th Cir. 1986) (impeachment
charged that plea bargain was improper influence on witnesses' testimony), cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 906 (1987); United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979)
(impeachment implied that witness had motive to fabricate because he was a paid informant); see also 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 420, at 188 (1980) [hereinafter 4 Louisell & Mueller] (impeachment charging recent fabrication or improper motive
arises by "evidence of bias or motive, or evidence (or even mere imputation) that the
witness has made it all up") (footnote omitted); cf Thomas, supra note 34, at 475-76
(discussing impeachment by charge of improper motive prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence); Note, Recent Fabrication,supra note 49, at 203-04 (same).
69. See United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.) (impeachment implied
recent fabrication by codefendant/witness who had entered into plea bargain with government), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); cf Thomas, supra note 34, at 475-79 (discussing impeachment by charge of recent fabrication; written before the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
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ment that antedates the fact or event giving rise to an improper motive to
fabricate is sufficiently independent of the motive to aid the trier of fact
in ascertaining the veracity of the in-court testimony?0° Since the witness
made the statement before the motive to fabricate existed, the prior statement rehabilitates by showing that the improper motive had no effect on
the testimony, thereby refuting the implication that the witness's testimony is contrived.7!
A prior consistent statement made while the impeaching fact is in
existence, however, is subject to the same motive to falsify as the in-court

testimony.72 The out-of-court statement is no more credible than the al-

ready impeached trial testimony and is mere repetition. 3 The prior
statement, therefore, should be excluded as having no probative value to
rebut the impeachment. 74 Admissiblity of prior consistent statements
under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) should be limited to those statements made
prior to, and independent of, the discrediting influence, 75 because only
70. See United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 906 (1987); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); see also United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir.
1978) (prior consistent statements must be relevant to the witness's credibility to aid the
jury in determining the veracity of the in-court testimony).
71. See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978) (prior consistent
statements that predate a motive to fabricate are probative of the veracity of the in-court
testimony since they show that the same statement was made at a time when the witness
was free from improper influence); see also United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766
(7th Cir.) (prior consistent statement given to FBI prior to plea agreement was reached
was "relevant to rebut inferences of recent fabrication motivated by the agreement"), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983).
72. See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985) ("declarant's motive in making both statements was the same"); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d
1321, 1351-52 (7th Cir.) (prior consistent statements made after motive to falsify inadmissible because they were subject to the same motive as the in-court testimony), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1978)
(prior consistent statements inadmissible since alleged improper motive was as operative
during pre-trial interview as at trial); see also 4 Wigmore, supra note 20, § 1128, at 268
(prior consistent statement made before alleged bias or interest is independent of
influence).
73. That a statement has been repeated several times does not make it more trustworthy, see United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986) (" 'mere repetition
does not imply veracity'" (quoting 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence '"
801(d)(1)(B)[01] at 801-117-18 (1981))), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 906 (1987); United States
v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985) (same) (quoting United States v. McPartlin,
595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979)), since a lie can be
repeated as often as the truth. See United States v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109, 1111 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1977) ("repetition of a lie does not enhance its truthfulness"); 4 Wigmore, supra note
20, § 1124, at 255 (repetition of prior consistent statement does not make the statement
more probable or veracious).
74. See United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107
S. Ct. 906 (1987); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); United
States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. McPartlin, 595
F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Quinto, 582
F.2d 224, 234-35 (2d Cir. 1978).
75. See United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986) (prior consistent
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then are they responsive to the impeachment. 76 Because FRE
801(d)(1)(B) presumes that prior consistent statements will be responsive
to the impeachment, it is implicit in the Rule that only those statements
antedating the motive to fabricate will be admitted.
Courts rejecting the requirement that a prior consistent statement antedate the motive to fabricate contend that FLE 801(d)(1)(B) must be
read and interpreted literally. 7 Because the temporal requirement is not
expressly mentioned in the Rule, 78 these courts hold that a prior consistent statement is admissible regardless of when it was made.79
Advocates of a literal interpretation, however, ignore that prior consistent statements are offered under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut a charge of
recent fabrication," and must have some probative force to accomplish
their intended purpose.8 1 Thus, the purpose for which the statements are
offered requires that they antedate the discrediting influence, as it is only
under those circumstances
that they are relevant to rebut the
82
impeachment.
A literal interpretation of FIE 801(d)(1)(B) is supported by the argument that had the drafters intended temporal limitations on admissibility, they would have expressly included them in the Rule.a3 In
statements must be "entirely independent of the alleged motive to fabriqate before they
can be admitted for substantive purposes"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 906 '(1987); United
States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978) (prior consistent statements are
only relevant to rebut when prior to, and thus independent of, alleged motive to
fabricate).
76. See United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
939 (1983); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978).
77. See United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 784 (4th Cir. 1983) (asserting that the
Rule contains no reference to temporal requirement and should be read literally); United
States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982) (admitting consistent statement
made subsequent to motive to fabricate because it "comports ... with the literal terms of
the Rule"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983).
78. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
79. See United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1117 (1983); see also United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (1 1th Cir.
1986) (prior consistent statements are admissible regardless of their temporal relation to
motive to fabricate); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. Unit B June
1981) (same); United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979) (same), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
80. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
81. See United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.) (prior consistent statements are relevant to rebut only if made before motive to fabricate), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
939 (1983); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.) (only prior consistent statements antedating motive to fabricate have probative value to rebut charge of
recent fabrication or improper motive), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v.
Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 235 (2d Cir. 1978) (prior consistent statements made prior to motive to fabricate are relevant on witness's credibility).
82. See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United
States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978).
83. See United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 784 (4th Cir. 1983).
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775

promulgating FRE 801(d)(1)(B), however, the drafters intended to give
substantive effect only to those prior consistent statements that would
have been admissible at common law for rehabilitation." The purpose of
the Rule was not to change common law standards of admissibility. 5
Rather, its purpose was to provide an exception to the hearsay rule8 6 for
those prior consistent statements that meet common law requirements of
admissibility.87 Courts at common law required that the prior consistent
statement be made before the motive to fabricate arose.88 Thus, restricting admissibility under the Rule to those statements made independent of
the alleged motive to fabricate best comports with the intent of the
drafters.8 9
In United States v. Hamilton,9 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir84. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note, which reads:
Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut
charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence. The prior
statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason
is apparent why it should not be received generally.
Id.; see also United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1979) (prior consistent
statements could be used as affirmative evidence under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), rather than
just as rehabilitative evidence as at common law), cert denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980);
United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978) (drafters of FRE 801(d)(1)(B)
intended to allow substantive use of only those statements that would have been admitted
to rehabilitate at common law).
85. See United States v. Lopez, 584 F.2d 1175, 1183 (2d Cir. 1978) (Neaher, J., dissenting) (FRE 801(d)(1)(B) expands the use to be made of prior consistent statements
once admitted, but admissibility standards remain the same as at common law); United
States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978) (FRE 801(d)(1)(B) has not changed
common law standards of admissibility of prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate); see also 4 Louisell & Mueller, supra note 68, § 420, at 194-95 (FRE 801(d)(1)(B)
contemplated no change from common law standard of admission of prior consistent
statements); Graham, supra note 23, at 587 n.42 ("No federal decision has since indicated
that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was meant to change the [common law] rule."). For a discussion
of the common law admission standard, see supra notes 35-38.
86. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Quinto, 582
F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) ...

insure[s] that any prior

consistent statement which satisfies its requirements will not be regarded as
'hearsay'....").
87. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note (the Rule gives substantive effect to those prior consistent statements that would have been admissible to rehabilitate at common law); see also United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978)
("standards for determining whether prior consistent statements can now be admitted as
substantive evidence are precisely the same as the traditional standards").
88. See Applebaum v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 472 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir.
1972) (quoting United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1403 (2d Cir. 1972)); United States
v. Rodriguez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (quoting Lindsey v. United States, 237
F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1956)); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944);
Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 1931); supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
89. See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Fed. R.
Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note (FRE 801(d)(l)(B) admits only those statements formerly admissible at common law).
90. 689 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

cuit, advocating the minority position, asserted that a prior consistent
statement made subsequent to a motive to fabricate is not automatically
excludable under FRE 801(d)(1)(B).91 The Hamilton court admitted the
prior consistent statement of a prosecution witness after the defense
counsel impeached the witness by implying that his in-court testimony
was influenced by a plea agreement. 9 2 The court maintained that such a
statement was admissible regardless of when made, as the statement's
timing only affected its materiality. 9 Thus, the jury 94
should be allowed to
determine the weight to be accorded the statement.
This reading of FRE 801(d)(1)(B) presumes that FRE 40395 will be
used to exclude such evidence when its probative value is outweighed by
unfair prejudice. 96 FRE 403, however, also may be used to exclude evidence that violates trial considerations by causing undue delay, confusion
91. See id. at 1273 ("[A]Ithough being prior in time to a motive to falsify may affect a
statement's materiality ... it is not a hard and fast rule for admissibility under Rule
801(d)(1)(B).") (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
92. See id.

93. See id. at 1273-74; see also United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11 th
Cir. 1986) (prior consistent statement admissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) regardless of
its timing); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (same);
United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
918 (1981); supra note 79.
94. See United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979) (court held that it
was proper to allow the jury to hear both the consistent and the impeaching statements to
evaluate the witness's credibility), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
95. Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
96. See United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273 (6th Cir. 1982) (dictum)
(recognizing Seventh Circuit view that FRE 403 is available to exclude prejudicial statements), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983); see also United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248,
1253 & n.9 (7th Cir.) (prior consistent statements admissible under FRE 801(d)(l)(B)
since cross-examination implied that statements predated motive, although trial court
would have discretion to exclude such statements under FRE 403 if probative value is
outweighed by undue prejudice), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979).
It is unlikely, however, that a prior consistent statement made subsequent to the motive to fabricate would be excluded as prejudicial under FRE 403. Although such a statement has only slight probative value, see infra note 101 and accompanying text, that
probative value would not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
since the same statement would already have been received at trial, and found not prejudicial. Nonetheless, prior consistent statements are subject to a balancing test to determine if their probative value is outweighed by the trial considerations enunciated in FRE
403, even if the evidence is not prejudicial. See United States v. Mock, 640 F.2d 629, 632
(5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981) (trial judge has discretion to exclude prior consistent statements under FRE 403 when their probativity is outweighed by their cumulativeness); cf
Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 935 (10th Cir.) (excluding evidence, the probative value of which was outweighed by "undue delay, waste of
time, and needless presentation of cumulative evidence"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853
(1984); Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1983) (evidence was excluded
under FRE 403, since probative value was outweighed by trial considerations, such as
undue delay and unnecessary introduction of cumulative evidence).
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of issues, or unnecessary presentation of cumulative evidence.9 7
Statements made subsequent to a motive to fabricate are merely cumulative because they are subject to the same improper influence or motive
to fabricate as the witness's in-court testimony.9 8 In addition, the introduction of a prior consistent statement may unduly delay the trial process because it will be necessary to introduce further evidence concerning
whether the statement was actually made and its surrounding
circumstances. 99
Admitting evidence of prior consistent statements made after a motive

to falsify ultimately violates the trial considerations set forth in FRE
4 0 3 ."°°

The statements' minimal probative worth' 0 1 should lead to their

exclusion as cumulative and time wasting evidence. Only prior statements antedating the motive to fabricate are relevant to rebut the
charge, 1°2 and thus, have enough probative value to overcome the exclusionary factors in FRE 403.103
97. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
98. A prior consistent statement made subsequent to the alleged motive to falsify has
no probative value to rebut the charge that the witness's trial testimony was fabricated.
See United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939
(1983); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
833 (1979); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1978). Such statements are cumulative since they would be capable of showing only that the witness had
made the same statement while under the same improper motivation, which in no way
shows that the motive to fabricate did not affect the in-court testimony. See United
States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d at
766; United States v. McPartlin,595 F.2d at 1351; Graham, supra note 23, at 587. Thus,
such statements add nothing to the fact finding process at trial. See United States v.
Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1252 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979).
99. See Graham, supra note 23, at 581 n.22; Martin, supra note 17, at 2, col. 4.
100. See Martin,supra note 17, at 2, col. 4 ("the evidence may take substantial time to
present, cross-examine on, and argue about; there is also a substantial risk that the jury
will overweight the probative value of repetition by itself").
101. See id (prior statements have slight probative value, as they are subject to the
same improper motive as trial testimony and thus have no force to rehabilitate); supra
note 98 and accompanying text; see also Graham, Federal Evidence, supra note 19,
§ 801.12, at 733-34 (prior consistent statements have inherently slight probative value
when viewed in light of FRE 403 trial concerns).
102. See United States v. Bowman, 798 F.2d 333, 338 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 906 (1987); United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 939 (1983); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233-34 (2d Cir.
1978); supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
103. See United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Admission under
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is limited to situations where the prior consistent statements have high
probative value."); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351 (7th Cir.) (only prior
consistent statements made before the alleged motive to fabricate have sufficient probative
value to rebut impeachment), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); see also 4 Weinstein,
supra note 2, 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-150 ("Substantive use under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is
limited to situations where high probative value is most likely.").
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B. Standardsof Admissibility of PriorConsistent Statements as
RehabilitativeEvidence

In addition to admitting prior consistent statements as substantive evidence under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), 1° courts also recognize that prior consistent statements may be used for the more limited purpose' 0 5 of
rehabilitating the credibility of a witness who has been impeached by a
charge of recent fabrication or improper motive. 106
In United States v. Quinto,' 07 the court indicated that the standards of
admission for substantive use of prior consistent statements also govern

rehabilitation. 0" In Quinto, a prosecution for tax evasion, the court ex-

cluded a memorandum, offered as a prior consistent statement, which
had been prepared by IRS agents after a pre-trial interview with the defendant. 0 9 The defense counsel impeached the testifying IRS agent by
implying that the agent was ruthlessly seeking the defendant's conviction, and thus, had an improper motive to falsify trial testimony."10 The
court, however, held that since the memorandum had not been made

before the improper motive arose, it was not relevant to rehabilitate the
witness's credibility, and thus, could not be used substantively under
FRE 801(d)(1)(B)."'
Other courts hold that statements offered for the lesser purpose of rehabilitation do not have to meet the more stringent standards prescribed
for substantive use. 12 Under this latter view, a prior statement offered to
rehabilitate need not be made prior to the motive for fabrication.1 3 This
result, however, is contrary to the common law and the intent of the
drafters of FRE 801(d)(1)(B)." 4
104. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's
note.
105. Prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate are introduced solely to show
that the witness actually made the consistent statement, and are not used as proof of the
facts asserted in the statement. See Thomas, supra note 34, at 474. Statements offered for
rehabilitation, thus, are used for a more limited purpose than statements offered substantively. See United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224,
233 (2d Cir. 1978).
106. See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 784-85 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 6970 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
107. 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978).
108. See id.at 233.
109. See id.at 229-32.
110. See id.at 234.
111. See id.at 235.
112. See United States v.Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 785 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69-70 (2d
Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
113. See supra note 37.
114. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note; supra note 84; see also
United States v. Lopez, 584 F.2d 1175, 1183 (2d Cir. 1978) (Neaher, J., dissenting)
("Although Rule 801 has ...expanded the use to be made of such statements once
properly admitted, nothing in the rule or in its history indicates that the traditional bases

1987]

PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

Even when not intending substantive use, however, the proponent of a
prior consistent statement offered to rehabilitate should be required to
demonstrate the statement's probative value to gain its admission." 5
This requirement is satisfied only if the statement antedated the motive to
fabricate. x16 Admission of a prior consistent statement made subsequent
to the motive to fabricate or improper influence serves no purpose other
than repetition.' 1 7 Thus, the same standards should govern
rehabilitative
8
and substantive use of prior consistent statements.'
Further, regardless of whether the statement is offered for its truth or
to rehabilitate, FRE 801(d)(1)(B) conditions admissibility of a prior consistent statement on its being offered to rebut a charge of recent
fabrication or improper motive.' 19 A statement that is relevant to rebut
the charge necessarily rehabilitates the witness's credibility. 2 ° At least
for the admission of prior consistent statements of a witness have been substantially relaxed or eliminated."); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978) ('To the
extent that a prior consistent statement is used for rehabilitative purposes, the Federal
Rules of Evidence have apparently not altered prior law."); United States v. Check, 582
F.2d 668, 680 (2d Cir. 1978) (substantive use of prior consistent statements under FRE
801(d)(1)(B) is limited to those statements admissible to rehabilitate at common law).
115. See Thomas, supra note 34, at 474 ("Tlhe question is one of relevancy: in particular, it is whether the act of making a consistent statement is relevant to refute the impeaching fact.").
116. The nature of a prior consistent statement is such that it is offered in response to
an attack on the witness's credibility from which the trier of fact may infer that the trial
testimony was fabricated or was the result of an improper motive. See supra notes 27-30
& 57 and accompanying text. Whether a prior consistent statement is offered rehabilitatively or substantively, it must be relevant to rebut the impeachment to gain admission.
See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978); supra notes 65-76 and
accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. The court in United States v.
Pierre, 781 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1986), seems to resolve the Second Circuit conflict over
admission of rehabilitative prior consistent statements, see supra note 10, in favor of a
lesser standard of admission for rehabilitative statements. Pierre,781 F.2d at 333; accord
United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring), aff'd
on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981). A closer reading of Pierre, however, shows that
the focus of the opinion is on whether the prior consistent statement offered to rebut has
some probative force beyond mere repetition. 781 F.2d at 331, 333. This view is in
accord with that of United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978), which limits
admissibility of rehabilitative and substantive prior consistent statements to those statements made before the alleged discrediting influence, to assure that the statements are
relevant for rebuttal purposes and are not merely repetitious. See id. at 232-33.
In addition, the Pierrecourt specified three situations where a prior consistent statement has rebuttal force: if it casts doubt on whether a prior inconsistent statement was
made; if it casts doubt on whether the impeaching statement is really inconsistent with
trial testimony; and if it clarifies the allegedly inconsistent statement. Pierre,781 F.2d at
333. These three situations are, however, more germane to a discussion of prior consistent statements offered for completeness, see infra Part 11(C), which are distinguished
from statements offered to rebut the inference that an improper motive led to fabrication
of the in-court testimony.
118. See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Check, 582 F.2d 668, 681 n.40 (2d Cir. 1978).
119. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B); supra notes 49 & 65.
120. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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one court and several commentators recognize that when prior consistent
statements are admitted for rehabilitative purposes, the net effect of admission is that the statement is considered by the jury as both probative
evidence of the facts asserted in the statement and evidence demonstrating the witness's credibility.'
Because there is no practical difference
between substantive and rehabilitative use of a prior consistent statement, 122 a statement admitted to rehabilitate a witness's credibility after
a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive always should be available as substantive evidence under FRE 801(d)(1)(B).12 3 By permitting
substantive use of evidence offered in rebuttal, FRE 801(d)(1)(B) does
not recognize a distinction between substantive and rehabilitative use of
prior consistent statements.
C. Prior Consistent Statements Offered for Completeness: Explaining

the Impeachment
In addition to permitting rebuttal by prior consistent statements to
24
show that a motive to fabricate did not affect the trial testimony,
courts also recognize that prior consistent statements can rebut impeachment by prior inconsistent statements that imply recent fabrication' 25
by explaining or qualifying the impeaching statements.126 This latter rebuttal purpose is accomplished by placing the impeaching statement into
121. See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1985) (although holding
that rehabilitative statements need not predate motive to fabricate, the court recognized
that distinction between rehabilitative and substantive use is slight since jury is likely to
use statement for both purposes once admitted); McCormick, supra note 19, § 251, at 747
("No sound reason is apparent for denying substantive effect when the statement is otherwise admissible. . . . The giving of a limiting instruction is needless and useless."); 1
Weinstein, supra note 62, %105[03], at 105-15 (1985) (Advisory Committee provided for
substantive use of a witness's prior statements since the jury would not be likely to limit
its use of the evidence without using it for its truth); Comment, Hearsay,supra note 20, at
1092-93 (no good reason for giving a limiting instruction "[s]ince the jury, in all
probability, would not understand, or would ignore" such an instruction); see also Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's note ("[I]f the opposite party wishes to open
the door for [the statement's] admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it
should not be received generally.").
122. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
123. Since prior consistent statements offered both substantively and rehabilitatively
are used to rebut the impeachment, see supra notes 27 & 49, and the statements should
meet the same standards to gain admission, see supra notes 115-18, there is no reason for
the proponent of a prior consistent statement to offer it merely for rehabilitative use.
124. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
125. Impeachment by the introduction of prior inconsistent statements may amount to
a charge of recent fabrication. See United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 533 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 462 (1986); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1252
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979); supra note 49.
126. See United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir. 1986) (prior consistent
statement offered in response to impeaching inconsistent statement clarified impeaching
statement under doctrine of completeness); Graham, supra note 23, at 595 (prior consistent statements could be used to support impeached witness's explanation that impeaching statement, while admitted, is incorrect or misleading to the trier of fact); supra note
54.
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127 or casting doubt on whether it actually
its proper context
is in8
12
consistent.
Admitting a prior consistent statement for explanatory purposes accords with the common law doctrine of completeness, 2 9 which provided
a basis for the admission of prior consistent statements offered to rehabilitate a witness by preventing a misleading use of evidence. 130 The draft-

ers of the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporated the doctrine of
completeness into FRE 106,'3 1 which provides an order of proof for
statements offered for completeness. 32 FRE 106 does not, however, pro127. See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); see
also United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 n.21 (2d Cir. 1980) (prior consistent
statements were admissible to place impeaching statements in context even had they not
predated motive to falsify).
128. See United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing that
prior consistent statements would have rebuttal force to show that allegedly inconsistent
statements were not actually inconsistent); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400
(7th Cir. 1985) (prior consistent statements contained in same report or interview with
prior inconsistent statements are relevant to show extent to which impeaching statements
were truly inconsistent); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1252 (7th Cir.) (prior
consistent statements in memoranda were admissible to show whether allegedly inconsistent statements in memoranda actually were inconsistent), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967
(1979).
129. At common law, when one part of a statement, writing or recording was used on
cross-examination to impeach a witness, other portions of the statement could be admitted to ensure that the trier of fact was not misled by portions taken out of context. Thus,
the balance of the statement was received to prevent incomplete evidence. See Coltrane
v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d
728, 735 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Corrigan, 168 F.2d 641, 645 (2d Cir. 1948);
Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 7 (8th Cir. 1944); supra note 39-42 and accompanying text.
130. See United States v. Fayette, 388 F.2d 728, 735 (2d Cir. 1968) (one part of statement was used to impeach witness; relevant remainder was admitted to ensure that jury
could evaluate evidence as a whole, so as to prevent incorrect inferences); United States v.
Lev, 276 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir.) (remainder of a statement was admitted on redirect "to
round out and complete" statements used on cross-examination), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
812 (1960); United States v. Weinbren, 121 F.2d 826, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1941) (remainder of
report was admitted to allow jury to examine it as a whole); see also Fed. R_ Evid. 106
advisory committee's note (doctrine of completeness is based on "the misleading impression created by taking matters out of context").
131. FRE 106 provides: "When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any
other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." Fed. R. Evid. 106.
132. See United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982) (FRE 106 was not
intended to ensure admission of statements otherwise inadmissible, merely to provide an
order of proof for documents admitted into evidence); 1 Weinstein, supra note 62, Ir
106[02], at 106-13 ("Rule 106 does not directly involve a question of admissibility; rather
it regulates a detail of the order of proof.. . ."); see also Fed. R. Evid. 106 advisory
committee's note (recognizing that one reason for FRE 106 is "the inadequacy of repair
work when delayed to a point later in the trial.").
Under this Rule, the adverse party may require that the remainder of an impeaching
statement be admitted at the time of the first statement's admission, rather than at some
point later in the trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 106; Fed. R. Evid. 106 advisory committee's
note; see also United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1082 (7th Cir. 1974) (although
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vide a basis for substantive admission of these statements.
To illustrate, in United States v. Pierre,"' a Drug Enforcement Ad-

ministration (DEA) agent was impeached by evidence indicating that
notes taken during a pre-trial interview with the defendant did not con-

tain a fact to which the agent testified at trial.

35

The agent then testified,

on redirect examination, that his formal interview report contained the

omitted fact, thus rebutting the implication that the informal notes were
inconsistent with the agent's in-court testimony. 1 36 The Pierre court admitted the agent's testimony as a prior consistent statement for purposes
of completeness,1 37 but limited the use of the statement solely to rehabilitation.1 38 In doing so, the Pierre court placed an unnecessary restriction
on the use of the prior consistent statement. Such a statement should

gain substantive admission under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) since it clarifies the
allegedly inconsistent statement,139thus rebutting the implication that the
agent's testimony was falsified.
Prior consistent statements offered for completeness are another type
of prior consistent statement which should gain substantive admission
under FRE 801(d)(1)(B). 140 Such statements rebut the charge of recent
fabrication by explaining the alleged inconsistency,' 4' rather than by
showing that the alleged motive did not affect the trial testimony. 42 Because of the distinction in the way these respective statements rebut, the
requirement that prior consistent statements must antedate the discrediting influence to be relevant to rebut the charge 43 does not apply to statements offered for completeness purposes.144 A prior consistent statement
decided prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, court recognized that completeness applied only to documents partially admitted into evidence), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 909 (1975).
133. See United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir.) (FRE 106 does not allow
for admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983);
United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); 1 Weinstein, supra
note 62, 1 106[01], at 106-10 (FRE 106 was not intended to allow introduction of evidence by circumventing other exclusionary rules).
The statements, therefore, must satisfy one of the hearsay exceptions to be used substantively. See United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir.) (proffered statements
were inadmissible hearsay unless able to satisfy one of the hearsay exceptions), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983).
134. 781 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1986).
135. See id. at 330.
136. See id. at 330, 334.
137. See id. at 333.
138. See id.
139. See infra note 140.
140. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). This Rule would exempt prior consistent statements for completeness purposes from the hearsay rule, provided the statements were
offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication arising from the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement.
141. See supra notes 14-15 & 126-28 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
144. See United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 n.21 (2d Cir. 1980) (dictum)
(even prior consistent statements made subsequent to the motive to fabricate would have
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PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

offered for completeness is relevant to rebut the impeaching statement
only when it has some probative force to explain the allegedly inconsistent statement. 145 Courts admitting statements for completeness should
do so only when the proffered statement is so proximate 4 6 to the statement used to impeach as to be part of the same document, made contemporaneously with it, or another statement closely related to the

impeaching statement. 47 This limitation on admission ensures that the

consistent statement truly qualifies the statement already admitted, re-

gardless of whether
it was made prior to any possible vacillation in the
1 48

witness's account.

CONCLUSION

FRE 801(d)(1)(B) provides criteria for determining the admissibility of
been admissible to place the impeaching statements in context); United States v. Rubin,
609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979) (admitting prior consistent statements to prevent prior
inconsistent statements being taken out of context, regardless of whether consistent statements predated any motive to fabricate), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981);
Graham, supra note 23, at 595 (prior consistent statements that explain an alleged inconsistent statment are admissible regardless of their timing).
145. See United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 272 (5th Cir. 1983) (admitting remainder of statement already introduced for completeness only when relevant to and
explanatory of the admitted portion), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984); United States v.
Main, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1982) (doctrine of completeness requires that remainder
be introduced only when relevant to, and thus explanatory of, admitted passages); United
States v. Littwin, 338 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1964) (balance of a document may be
introduced only to explain or rebut adverse inferences created by incomplete evidence),
cert denied, 380 U.S. 911 (1965); see also Graham,supra note 23, at 595 (prior consistent
statement explanatory of impeaching statement "buttresses overall credibility of the witness through its ameliorating effect upon the impeachment").
146. See Graham, supra note 23, at 595-96 (prior consistent statements need not predate inconsistent statements, however, proximity of statements, and time that has elapsed
between their making, is to be considered when determining the probative value of prior
consistent statements).
147. See United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 1986) (evidence from
agent's formal report was admitted as prior consistent statement to rebut inference of
fabrication created by agent's informal report omitting fact to which agent testified at
trial); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1985) (prior consistent statements were admitted as relevant, since consistent and allegedly inconsistent statements
were part of interview report and were made contemporaneously); United States v.
Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979) (prior consistent statements contained in report
used to impeach a witness with alleged inconsistencies contained therein were admitted to
place impeaching statements in context and prevent misleading impression created on
cross-examination), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); see also United States v.
Jamar, 561 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (4th Cir. 1977) (refusing to permit defendant's daughter's
prior testimony to corroborate defendant's prior testimony, as defendant's testimony was
received in complete form, and daughter's statements were not necessary to place it in
context).
148. See United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986) (prior consistent
statements admitted to clarify prior inconsistent statements regardless of the consistent
statements' timing in relation to the impeaching statements); United States v. Rubin, 609
F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979) (prior consistent statement admissible for completeness purposes "regardless of whether an improper motive existed at or after the prior statement"),
aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
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a prior consistent statement after a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence. Prior consistent statements must antedate the alleged
discrediting influence to be relevant to rehabilitate, and thereby gain substantive admission under FRE 801(d)(1)(B). This temporal requirement
also ensures that the prior statments will not be merely cumulative, and
thus would have enough probative value to ensure that the exclusionary
factors under FRE 403 do not outweigh the statement's probative value.
In addition, prior consistent statements offered for the more limited
purpose of rehabilitation must meet substantive admissibility standards
to ensure that the statements are probative of the witness's credibility.
Indeed, because FRE 801(d)(1)(B) conditions admission on whether the
prior consistent statement rehabilitates the impeached witness, the Rule,
in effect, has eliminated the distinction between substantive and rehabilitative use.
Although prior consistent statements offered under FRE 801(d)(1)(B)
to rebut the alleged effect of a motive to fabricate on the trial testimony
must must be made prior to the motive to be relevant, statements offered
to ensure completeness need not meet such a requirement. Rather, prior
consistent statements offered to ensure completeness should gain substantive admission under FRE 801(d)(1)(B) if they are proximate to, and
related to the subject matter of, the impeaching inconsistent statement so
as to provide the trier of fact with an explanation or clarification of the
statement already introduced.
Judith A. Archer

